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Who	pays	for	the	war	on	Covid-19?
The	Covid-19	outbreak	has	renewed	calls	for	the	Eurozone	to	establish	a	form	of	debt	mutualisation,
potentially	via	the	creation	of	‘Coronabonds’.	So	far,	however,	there	is	little	sign	of	such	a	measure
being	agreed.	Iain	Begg	writes	that	it	is	not	ideas	or	proposals	that	are	lacking	at	the	EU	level,	but
rather	an	absence	of	political	will	to	confront	the	many	hard	choices	now	facing	Europe.
The	rapid	and	decisive	policy	actions	by	many	governments	and	central	banks	to	mitigate	the	adverse
economic	effects	of	Covid-19	have	been	impressive.	Fiscal	packages	launched	by	governments	of	all	hues
comprise	grants,	loans	and	guarantees	intended	to	prevent	economies	collapsing,	with	varying	degrees	of
targeting.
Their	unavoidable	consequence	will	be	a	renewed	surge	in	public	debt	levels,	potentially	resulting	in	insolvency
risks	for	the	most	indebted	countries	or	those	worst	affected	by	the	crisis.	This	prospect	calls	for	strategic	initiatives
to	deal	with	the	medium	and	longer-term	economic	effects,	including	at	the	supranational	level.
However,	in	contrast	to	the	coordinated	action	from	the	G20	seen	in	2009,	international	action	has	been	limited.	At
the	EU	level,	too,	cross-border	solidarity	has	been	found	wanting,	and	the	days	before	Easter	saw	the	unedifying
spectacle	of	Eurozone	ministers	yet	again	embroiled	in	old,	tired	disputes	about	risk	sharing	versus	risk	reduction.
The	core	problem,	though,	is	that	the	scope	for	a	fiscal	response	by	the	EU	is	very	limited,	in	spite	of	this	bullish
statement	from	the	four	Presidents	of	the	ECB,	the	Commission,	the	European	Council	and	the	Eurogroup:
‘There	is	a	lot	of	room	for	solidarity	within	the	existing	instruments	and	institutions.	We	have	to	exploit
these	tools	fully	and	remain	open	to	doing	more.	A	strong	package	is	in	the	making.	Our	goal	is	clear:
we	will	protect	European	citizens	and	businesses	from	the	economic	impact	of	the	pandemic.’
The	state,	including	at	the	EU	level,	has	to	determine	what	would	be	a	socially	just	approach	to	distributing	the
short-term	costs.	Awkward	questions	are	being	asked	about	how	the	burden	of	coping	with	the	economic	effects	of
the	pandemic	should	be	shared.	A	steep	increase	in	public	debt	means	a	bigger	burden	for	future	taxpayers.
Should	wages	be	cut	or	taxes	be	raised	now	to	lessen	the	burden	on	the	next	generation?
In	the	corporate	sector,	should	shareholders	forgo	dividends	and	see	their	equity	depleted	before	receiving	public
money?	Is	it	reasonable	for	rich	football	clubs	like	FC	Barcelona	–	already	embroiled	in	an	unseemly	dispute	about
players’	remuneration	–	or	Liverpool	FC	to	seek	state	support	for	‘furloughed’	staff?
Should	banks	be	lenient	with	cash-strapped	borrowers	or	landlords	defer	evictions	of	tenants	unable	to	pay	the	rent,
and	for	how	long	can	such	forbearance	be	expected	to	last?	Should	hard-hit	sectors,	such	as	aviation,	receive
special	treatment?	The	US	has	said	yes,	but	(so	far)	the	UK	has	demurred.
Governments	need	to	find	answers	to	all	these	questions,	and	have	to	strike	a	balance	between	the	health
emergency,	short-term	damage	to	the	economy	and	longer-term	economic	prospects,	while	also	ensuring	a	socially
equitable	distribution	of	the	burden.	They	will	be	sharply	criticised	if	they	misjudge	the	responses	and	the	populists
are	waiting	to	pounce.
A	European	solution
Can	the	EU	contribute?	In	an	interview	with	the	BBC,	Italian	Prime	Minister	Giuseppe	Conte	was	categorical	in
saying	[as	translated	by	the	BBC]	‘we	need	an	economic	and	social	response	at	the	European	level’.	He	recognises
this	is	a	seminal	moment	for	the	EU	and,	while	determined	to	avoid	it,	agreed	there	is	a	risk	for	the	EU	as	a	whole.
As	he	put	it:
‘If	Europe	fails	to	come	up	with	a	monetary	and	financial	policy	adequate	for	the	biggest	challenge	since
the	second	world	war,	for	sure	not	only	Italians	but	European	citizens	will	be	deeply	disappointed’.
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In	early	April,	the	EU	had	launched	a	Coronavirus	Response	Investment	Initiative,	with	a	headline	total	of	€37
billion.	It	will	enable	member	states	to	support	investments	in	healthcare	and	in	other	sectors	affected	by	the	virus,
using	€8	billion	of	unused	Cohesion	Policy	allocation	from	2019	and	bringing	forward	€29	billion	from	Cohesion
Policy	allocations	for	2020.
This	will	help	meet	some	immediate	needs,	but	for	the	most	part,	is	not	‘new	money’.	A	more	insidious	problem	is
that	spending	at	the	EU	level	will	require	national	treasuries	to	remit	money	to	Brussels,	subtracting	from	their	own
fiscal	capacity.	A	different	approach	is,	therefore,	needed.
New	measures
Subsequently,	though	only	at	the	second	attempt,	the	Eurogroup	managed	to	agree	on	‘additional	crisis	response
instruments	and	preparing	the	ground	for	the	recovery’.	Most	of	the	details	remain	sketchy,	but	as	Eurogroup
President	Mario	Centeno	put	it	in	his	letter	to	the	European	Council	President,	they	propose	‘to	set	up	immediately
three	safety	nets	to	shield	us	from	the	short-term	economic	consequences	of	the	COVID-19	crisis:	for	workers,
businesses	and	sovereigns’.
Mario	Centeno,	President	of	the	Eurogroup,	during	a	video	conference	on	9	April	2020,	Credit:	European	Union
A	further	proposal	is	for	a	‘Recovery	Fund’	to	underpin	investment	and	to	‘help	spread	the	costs	of	the	extraordinary
crisis	over	time	through	appropriate	financing’.	However,	the	next	sentence	is	revealing:	some	Eurozone	members
‘were	of	the	view	that	it	should	be	based	on	common	debt	issuance,	while	others	advocated	alternative	solutions’.
What	this	elliptical	formula	disguises	is	that	the	finance	ministers	could	not	agree	on	mutualisation	of	debt.	For	the
(mainly	northern)	creditor	countries,	the	much-touted	idea	of	‘Coronabonds’	had	to	be	rejected	because	it	would
open	the	door	to	fully-fledged	Eurobonds,	committing	taxpayers	in	the	prudent	‘north’	to	guarantee	the	borrowing	of
what	they	see	as	the	incorrigibly	profligate	‘south’.
The	intractable	problem,	though,	is	that	the	new	measures	agreed	by	the	Eurogroup	are	loans,	not	grants,	and	will
add	to	the	existing	debt	stock.	The	Eurogroup	did	at	least	agree	not	to	insist	on	tough,	‘troika-style’	conditions	for
accessing	the	loans,	but	the	debts	will	remain	national,	and	could	portend	a	new	sovereign	debt	crisis.
Concluding	comments
Pope	Francis	has	urged	the	EU,	in	the	‘spirit	of	solidarity	that	enabled	it	to	overcome	the	rivalries	of	the	past’,	to
confront	the	current	‘epochal	challenge’.	It	is	no	exaggeration	to	assert	that	how	matters	are	resolved	will	shape	the
Union’s	future.	As	things	stand,	Italy	could	prove	to	be	the	litmus	test	of	how	far	Europe	is	prepared	to	move,
because	its	already	high	debt	to	GDP	ratio	leaves	it	very	vulnerable.	Yet	old	objections	persist.
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In	a	recent	interview,	Otmar	Issing	(former	ECB	Chief	Economist)	sought	to	play	down	expectations	of	what	he
called	a	‘Hamiltonian	moment’	–	referring	to	the	decision	in	1790	by	Alexander	Hamilton,	then	Secretary	of	the
Treasury,	to	create	the	US	Treasury	bond.	The	Dutch	finance	minister,	Wopke	Hoekstra,	was	more	forthright	after
the	Eurogroup	meeting:	‘Eurobonds	is	a	thing	I	wasn’t	OK	with,	I	am	not	OK	with	and	I	will	never	be	OK	with’.
In	the	preface	to	his	1940	pamphlet	How	to	pay	for	the	war,	Maynard	Keynes	wrote:	‘the	sacrifices	required	by	war
direct	more	attention	than	before	to	sparing	them	where	they	can	be	least	afforded’.	The	sacrifices	made	by	so
many	are	not	in	doubt,	but	will	they	lead	to	fresh	thinking	on	what	the	EU	needs?
It	is	not	ideas	or	proposals	that	are	lacking,	but	an	absence	of	political	will	to	confront	the	many	hard	choices.	As
Keynes	also	said,	in	the	preface	to	The	General	Theory	of	Employment,	Interest	and	Money:	‘the	difficulty	lies,	not
in	the	new	ideas,	but	in	escaping	from	the	old	ones’.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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